Theories About Disagreement

Wittgenstein`s theory: Deep disagreements are disagreements about hinge commitments. Footnote 8 In the previous section, I studied the metaphysics of Wittgenstein`s theory of deep disagreement. I have argued that it faces a number of challenges in the face of the Desire for a satisfactory theory of deep disagreements. Fossil stock: When it comes to facts about the distant past, you should tailor your beliefs to the evidence of history and fossils. Historical and fossil stock is the most reliable method of knowing the distant past. Consider the metaphysical differences about the existence of God, the nature of reality, etc. Many of these differences seem profound. Think, for example, of the type of inconsistent visions at play: idealistic, immaterial visions, on the one hand, realistic, materialistic visions on the other; or the opposing worldviews at stake, such as the Hindu versus the evangelical Christian. Prima facie is difficult to see how the fundamental normative theory of principles can explain this type of case because they do not have to argue over anything normative. Rather, they tend to be above different existential propositions and other quantifiable propositions. A satisfactory theory of deep disagreements must satisfy some desiderates. This desidrate will serve as necessary conditions for the adequacy of the theory.

To try to understand what this desiderate should be, let`s focus on the Young Earth Creationist case as a basic case. First of all, cases like the Young Creator of the Earth seem to be real disagreements. Henry and Richard disagree as to whether earth is more than 6,000 years old. Intuitively, it`s a factual question: either the Earth is more than 6,000 years old, or it`s less than that. At least one of them is wrong. Friemann R (2005) Emotional backing and the feeling of deep disagree. Informal Logic 25 (1):51-63 Indeed, deep disagreements risk being confused with unfailing disagreements. A flawless disagreement is one where, although the disputants seem to disagree, none of them is “responsible” in the sense that none of them commits an aletic or epistemic error.

See Kölbel (2004) for this view. Note that the substantive question is whether deep disagreements are flawless, just as it is a substantive question of whether deep disagreements can be resolved rationally. In both cases, it must come from non-trivial philosophical arguments, rather than being integrated into our representation of what deep disagreements are. 09.00-10.00: Chris Ranalli: Deliberative theory of knowledge and disagreement This distinction also goes to the explanation of the systematics of deep disagreements. For example, if the Earth existed in the distant past, so that it is millions of years old or more, this obligation is a pivotal obligation, this obligation is intuitively found in certain logical, probabilistic and epistemic relationships with other statements. For example, this means that a second mode of vision is transcendental arguments. Such arguments must show that an otherwise problem-free epistemic state, such as self-knowledge, self-reference, or experience, is a necessary condition for a potentially problematic epistemic state, such as the reliability of a presumed source of justification such as perception, induction, or memory. For example, footnote 23 McDowell (2006) states that knowledge of experience is a necessary condition for the reliability of the perception experience. If the argument is conclusive, it would give us a priori a reason to trust the perception experience.

Similarly, Davidson (1984) offers a transcendental argument in favor of the reliability of testimony: basically, a necessary condition for the successful interpretation of other spokesmen is that we are entitled to trust the testimony (cf. . . .