In the United States, executive agreements are binding internationally when negotiated and concluded under the authority of the president on foreign policy, commander-in-chief of the armed forces, or a previous act of Congress. For example, the president, as commander-in-chief, negotiates and enters into status of forces agreements (SOFAs) governing the treatment and disposition of U.S. armed forces stationed in other nations. However, the President may not unilaterally conclude executive agreements on matters not within his constitutional authority. In such cases, an agreement should take the form of an agreement between Congress and the executive or a contract with deliberation and approval by the Senate.  A notable expansion of presidential power in this area first manifested itself in President McKinley`s government. At the beginning of the war with Spain, the president announced that the United States would be bound for the duration by the last three principles of the Paris Declaration, a course that, as Professor Wright notes, “would undoubtedly go a long way to establish these three principles as an international law committed by the United States in future wars.” 423 Hostilities with Spain ended in August 1898 with a ceasefire whose terms largely determined the peace treaty that followed, 424 and the ceasefire of 11 November 1918 largely determined the conditions for definitive peace with Germany in 1918. It was also President McKinley who, in 1900, on his own exclusive authority as commander-in-chief, set up a 5,000-man land force and a naval force to cooperate with similar contingents of other powers to save Beijing`s embassies from boxers; A year later, once again, without consulting Congress or the Senate, he accepted for the United States the protocol of compensation for boxers between China and the intervening powers. 425 Willoughby comments favourably on the Beijing Protocol: “This case is interesting because it shows how the force of circumstances has forced us to resume European practice with reference to an international agreement which, apart from the question of compensation, was almost exclusively political in nature. According to constitutional practice in Europe, purely political treaties are usually concluded by the executive. However, the situation in China has abundantly justified President McKinley`s failure to submit the minutes to the Senate. Beijing`s isolation, jealousy between the Allies, and the Chinese government`s shifting escape tactics would have made anything but impossible to reach an agreement on the ground. 426 Many types of executive agreements form the ordinary daily water of diplomatic mills.
These include. B minor territorial adjustments, border remediation, border surveillance, regulation of fishing rights, private money rights against another government or its nationals, in the words of the stories, “the only rights deprived of sovereignty”. 417 Crandall lists dozens of such agreements with other governments with the permission of the president. 418 Such agreements were generally oriented towards specific and relatively trivial disputes, and the settlement which they produced ipso facto lost their effects. There are also diplomatic means as venerable as the “protocol”, which marks a phase of negotiation of a treaty, and the modus vivendi, which is to serve as a temporary substitute for a contract. Executive agreements become constitutional if they are a determining factor for future foreign policy and, therefore, for the fate of the country. Especially as a result of our participation in World War II and our immersion in the conditions of prevailing international tensions and after the war, presidents made agreements with other governments, some of which brought temporary alliances closer together. . . .